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Abstract. This work explores the firm’s supplier selection question that the 
competitor firm and the third-party supplier can supply the substitutable 
component. We consider a supply chain with two competing original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) and two third-party suppliers. The two OEMs produce 
the competing products which are comprised by two main components. Each 
OEM only can produce one component in-house and each third-party supplier 
only supplies one component. The OEMs must decide whether to outsource the 
other component to the competing OEM or to a third-party supplier. We discuss 
the different supplier selection strategies and compare the OEMs profits in 
different decision. We find that there are conditions where, while one of the 
OEMs should outsource to the competing firm, outsourcing to a third-party 
supplier is the optimal strategy for the other OEM even when the cost of the 
third-party supplier is more expensive and the competition is intense.  
Keywords: Outsourcing selection, Co-opetition, Price competition 
1   Introduction 
Competitors Nissan and Daimler’s Mercedes are both outsourcees and outsourcers of 
one another. In particular, Nissan uses Daimler’s Mercedes front-wheel-drive 
architecture platform for its Infiniti luxury vehicle and supplies Daimler with diesel 
and gas engines [1]. Moreover, Samsung and Google, Leica and Panasonic also 
compete with the end product in the market and supply the component to each other 
in the component wholesale market [2] [3]. We call this relationship is co-opetition. 
The previous research literature (e.g., [4] [5] [6]) has researched the co-opetition 
problem about the competing firms and points out that the competitor can earn 
revenue from both competing products with two firms cooperation. Consequently, the 
competitor will not price its own product aggressively, thus leading to a lower degree 
of competition.  
In this paper, we consider the supplier-selection problem of two competing OEMs. 
The OEMs can produce one component in-house and must outsource the other 
component to a third-party supplier or to the competing OEM. We consider the case 
where competing OEMs will cooperate as supply-chain partners only if their total 
profit is higher than that they can get if they do not cooperate. 
2 Literature Review 
Our work in this paper relates to the stream of research on the topic of forming a 
supply-chain relationship with competitors. Bengtsson and Kock [7] define the 
co-opetition as a strategy embodying simultaneous cooperation and competition 
between firms. Gnyawali and Park [8] investigate why and how co-opetition between 
large firms and impact the participating firms and the industry. Venkatesh et al. [4] 
find that the manufacturers of proprietary component brands often have the ability to 
effect for the end-products and face to choose its role from sole entrant, co-optor and 
component supplier in the market. Lim and Tan [9] focus on the outsourcing of the 
supplier as a direct competitor of the buyer firm in the downstream marketplace. 
Wang et al. [6] investigate the advantage of being the first mover when a contract 
manufacturer acts as both supplier and competitor. Moreover, Pun [10] considers the 
supplier selection of a manufacturer can either outsource to an independent supplier 
or to its competitor when the firm wants to do R&D for the end-product.  
Our paper differs from these papers in the following ways: First, we assume that 
there are two OEMs competing in the market and each of them can supply the 
component with its brand. Second, in our paper, we assume that there is price 
competition for the OEMs in the market. The OEM’s decision about the outsourcing 
will have impact for total profit. To the best of our knowledge, the case that the 
competing OEMs supply the component to each other is a new type in supply chain. 
3 Model Framework 
We consider a supply chain with two OEMs (firms G and S) and two third-party 
suppliers and each OEM sales a competing product. And each product consists of two 
main components, A and B. Firm G (firm S) produces component A (component B) 
in-house and must outsource component B (component A) either to a third-party 
supplier firm B (firm A) or to the competing OEM firm S (firm G). The basic frame 
work of the model is similar to that in Pun and Bo [11]. The OEM and the third-party 
supplier each produce the component with different costs. Specifically, the production 
cost of the OEMs is normalized to zero, and the production cost of the third-party 
suppliers is c , so that the third-party suppliers have higher production cost when
0c and the OEMs have higher production cost when 0c . We use the 
demand model presented by McGuire and Staelin [12] and Staelin [13]. Specifically, 
the demand of the end-product of firm },{ SGi is as follows: 
    
iii
ppD


 



11
1
1                          (1) 
i is the competitor of firm i and pi is the price of product i . 10  is the degree 
of competition between the two products, so that the two products are not competing 
when is zero and competition increases in . 
In this game, the two OEMs first choose the outsourcing strategy. Then, as 
commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. [14] [15] [16]), the suppliers set the 
wholesale price w simultaneously. Lastly, the two competing OEMs choose the retail 
price p .The OEM can choose to outsource to the competing OEM or to the third-party 
supplier. We use the abbreviations T and C (Third-party supplier and Competing 
OEM) to denote the different suppliers and the first letter to denote the component 
supplier for firm G and the second letter for firm S. As a result, we will get four 
strategies as {TT, TC, CT, CC}, where TT denotes that firm G outsources to the 
third-party supplier and firm S outsources to the third-party supplier. Since strategy 
TC and strategy CT are symmetrical, without loss of generality, we omit the results of 
strategy CT to avoid redundancy.  
 
Table 1.  The profits of firms in different strategies. 
Firm Strategy TT Strategy TC Strategy CC 
G (OEM) GBG Dwp )(   SGGBG DwDwp  )(  SGGSG DwDwp  )(  
S (OEM) 
SAS Dwp )(   SGS Dwp )( 
 
GSSGS DwDwp  )(  
A (3
rd
-party) 
SA Dcw )(   0  0  
B (3
rd
-party) 
GB Dcw )(   GB Dcw )( 
 0  
In the next analysis, we will use
G and S to represent the profits of the two OEMs. 
And we use superscripts to denote the outsourcing strategy. For example, TC
S
represents the profit of firm S under strategy TC. Specifically, firm G and firm S will 
cooperate (strategy TC or CC) only if they can earn higher total profits than they do 
under strategy TT. For notational convenience, let the total profit of the two firms be
SGGS   . Then the two competing OEMs will choose the strategy that gives 
them the largest total profit.  
4    Analysis 
In this section, we will compare total profit and present the optimal outsourcing 
strategy. Throughout the analysis, we will focus on the region where demands of both 
products are positive. We consider another strategy that two OEMs both produce the 
two main components in-house and use II
GS as the total profit under this strategy. We 
will compare the total profit in the following and discuss the competition and 
cooperation.  
Proposition 1. The comparisons of the total profit of the two OEMs are as follows. 
a. )(0   c
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It has been shown that selling through third-party retailers can mitigate competition 
between competing manufacturers (e.g. [12]). Proposition 2a states that competition 
between OEMs can also be mitigated with outsourcing to the third-party suppliers. In 
particular, when the two products are independent ( 0 ), the OEMs should 
produce both components in-house (strategy II) in order to eliminate the inefficiency 
of double marginalization unless the third-party supplier has a very low cost (
Dc <G0(0)=-1
). It can be shown that G0(q ) increases in q . Consequently, when 
compared to strategy II, strategy TT becomes more valuable as competition 
intensifies since outsourcing to a third-party supplier can mitigate competition. 
Since the third-party suppliers are not responsible for producing any of the 
components under strategies II and CC, the comparison of the total profit between 
these two strategies remains independent of c (cf. Proposition 2b). Two drivers in 
particular have an impact on the comparison between strategies II and CC. First, 
outsourcing to a competitor can minimize competition; second, producing all 
components in-house can eliminate the inefficiency of double marginalization. When 
all firms have the same production costs ( 0c ), Proposition 2a shows that the 
advantage of mitigating competition by outsourcing to a third-party supplier is smaller 
than the inefficiency of double marginalization introduced by deploying strategy TT. 
Consequently, the total profit is larger under strategy II than it would be under 
strategy TT, regardless of the degree of competition. Proposition 2b extends the result 
of Proposition 2a by illustrating that, compared with outsourcing to a third-party 
supplier, outsourcing to a competitor is more effective in mitigating competition. In 
particular, when competition is sufficiently strong ( 313  ) and all firms have the 
same production costs ( 0c ), the two OEMs are better off mitigating competition 
by deploying strategy CC than by deploying strategy II despite incurring the 
inefficiency of double marginalization. 
Proposition 2c further illustrates that outsourcing to a competitor does a better job of 
mitigating competition compared to a strategy of outsourcing to a third-party supplier. 
Specifically, when the level of competition between the two products is intermediate 
(e.g., 2/1 ), then mitigating competition is marginally valuable, and the total profit 
under strategy CC is higher as long as the costs of the third-party suppliers are 
sufficiently high ( 62.0)2/1(1 c ). When the level of competition is intense 
( 1 ), mitigating competition becomes very important and, hence, strategy CC is 
always superior to strategy TT, even when the third-party suppliers costs are 
extremely low ( 

)(lim 1
1


c ). It can be shown that )0()0( 32 b  (cf. 
Propositions 2d-e). Therefore, depending on the relative cost efficiency between the 
OEMs and the third-party suppliers, when there is no competition, the OEMs would 
choose between two options: both would outsource to one another or both would 
outsource to third-party suppliers. When there is no competition, the firms are never 
better off in deploying the asymmetric strategy (strategy TC). In the presence of 
competition, however, the comparisons of the total profit under strategies TT, TC and 
CC are not monotonic in the degree of cooperation between the two competing 
OEMs. Specifically, Proposition 2d shows that some degree of cooperation between 
competitors (strategy TC) is better than no cooperation (strategy TT) as long as the 
third-party suppliers’ costs are larger than )(2  . As  increases, )(2  decreases, 
hence, a certain degree of cooperation (strategy TC) becomes relatively more valuable 
when compared to strategy TT because the third-party suppliers must be relatively 
more cost effective ( )(2  more negative) for strategy TT to be optimal. However, 
Proposition 2e demonstrates that maximum cooperation (strategy CC) is not always 
better than some cooperation (strategy TC). When the degree of competition is small, 
it can be shown that the total profit under maximum cooperation (strategy CC) is 
larger than what it would be under some degree of cooperation (strategy TC) as long 
as the third-party suppliers’ costs are not too low ( )(3 ac  where 0)(3  a ). 
However when competition is strong, we find that TC
GS is larger than 
CC
GS when the 
OEMs’ costs are similar to those of the third-party suppliers. Therefore, cases do exist 
where the total profit under strategy TC is larger than it would be under strategy CC 
in spite of the cost disadvantage of the third-party supplier ( 0c ). We present the 
optimal strategy in Proposition 3. The outside region represents the cases in which no 
demand of both products is positive. 
Proposition 2. The optimal outsourcing strategy is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  Optimal outsourcing strategy. 
When being the outsourcee of the competitor (firm S), the OEM (firm G) can have 
two revenue sources: one from the wholesale market and the other from the end 
product market. Therefore, when there is no competition between the two competing 
products ( 0 ), the two OEMs will outsource to one another (strategy CC). 
However, if the third-party supplier is significantly more cost effective ( 0c ), 
they will outsource to the third-party supplier (strategy TT). 
Previous research has shown that competitors cooperating as supply-chain partners 
can minimize competition. Therefore, one might expect that when competition 
intensifies ( increases), the region where strategy CC is optimal will also increase 
because there is more cooperation under strategy CC than that of strategy TC. We 
find, however, that this insight might not hold. The total profit of both OEMs consists 
of two drivers. The first is the relative cost efficiency between the OEMs and the 
third-party suppliers c , and, numerically, we observe that this relative production 
cost has more impact to the total profit under strategy CC ( CC
GS ) than to the total profit 
under strategy TC ( TC
GS ). The other factor that affects the total profit is the degree of 
competition between the two products ( ). We find that the total profit under 
strategy TC is more likely to be larger than it would be under strategies TT and CC 
when is large (cf. Proposition 2). As a result, one of the firms can be better off 
outsourcing to the third-party supplier (strategy TC), even when the third-party 
supplier’s production costs are higher than those of the competitor and when the 
competition is strong (cf. Point X in Fig. 1). 
Next, we extend our results by altering some assumptions in the model. We assume 
the difference between third-party supplier and competing OEM is the quality of the 
components rather than the cost. Under this discussion, the basic framework of the 
model and the game sequence are similar to that in the previous discussion but the 
demand function is different. All firms have the same production costs ( 0c ). 
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The solution process in this section can be proved in the same way as in the previous 
solution, respectively, and thus the proofs are omitted for brevity. We just summarize 
the main findings here.  
Proposition 3. The optimal outsourcing strategy is presented in Fig. 2 and is 
expressed mathematically as follows (where , and  are threshold value). 
 
Fig. 2. Optimal Outsourcing Strategy for Different Quality. 
When   , the equilibrium strategy is that firm G and firm S both choose to 
outsource to the third-party suppliers so that they are just pure competitors in the 
market. It is because when is small, outsource to the third-party supplier is better. 
When  1 , outsourcing to the third-party supplier, OEM will also get the 
larger profit than outsourcing to the competitor. When  , the best choice for 
both OEMs is outsourcing the ingredient to each other, even in this case OEMs could 
not price its product aggressively. When compared to the profit of OEMs under others 
strategies, it shows that both OEMs get the largest profit for outsourcing to each other 
(strategy CC). 
And we consider the case where outsourcing to competitor, the OEM will get high 
quality end-product (i.e., 1 ). In strategy CT, firm G will get the high quality 
end-product with outsourcing to firm S and firm S just outsources to the third-party 
supplier. The demands and the prices of firm G and firm S are better off with the 
increases of simultaneously in strategy CT. We know when firm G outsources to 
the competitor firm S; it will manufacture the different quality end-product. With
1 , the quality of firm G’s end-product is high. The high quality end-product 
brings the larger total market demand for firm G and therefore allows firm G to 
charge a higher price. Since firm G charges a higher price which has the positive 
impact on firm S’s end-product demand even firm S’s total market demand is 
unchanged. So the demand of firm S is also increasing and allows firm S to charge a 
higher price even its end-product’s quality is lower than that of firm G. We also get 
that the increasing speed of price for firm G is faster than it for firm S (i.e.,
 



 CTS
CT
G PP ). As a result, the demands and the prices for both OEMs are better off 
with increasing in strategy CT (strategy TC). 
Next, consider the case where outsourcing to competitor, the OEM will get low 
quality end-product (i.e., 1 ). In strategy CT, firm G will get the low quality 
end-product with outsourcing to firm S. We know that the demands and the prices of 
firm G and firm S are better off with the increases of  simultaneously in strategy 
CT. With increasing, the total market demand of firm G is increasing even which is 
less than that of firm S. The increasing total market demand allows firm G to charge a 
higher price. When firm G charges the higher price, firm S will get larger end-product 
demand since the price of firm G has the positive impact on firm S’s demand and 
allowing firm S to charge a higher price. And we can know
 



 CTS
CT
G PP . So we get 
the result that the demands and the prices for both OEMs are better off with
increasing in strategy CT even 1 . Similarly, in strategy TC, the demands and 
the prices of firm G and firm S are better off with the increasing of simultaneously 
in strategy TC.  
So we know that under strategy CT and strategy TC, the demand and the price of the 
both OEMs will increase consistently whether 1 or 1 .  
5    Conclusion 
In this paper we talk about the outsourcing strategy of two OEMs. Because the 
cooperation between the competitors could reduce the competition, people think more 
cooperation is the better. But in the research, we find that since two OEMs have the 
price competition in the market, one OEM had better outsource to the third-party 
supplier even if the competitor OEM’s production cost is lower. So the cooperation 
degree is important. 
We research the supplier selection question with some limitations. First we assume 
that the information about the production cost is complete information. When the cost 
is private, we must think about the information sharing or information leakage 
question. Second, we study the market where the demand of the market is certain. If 
the demand is uncertain, the firm must think about the inventory problem and leftover 
problem. These will make the supply chain inefficient.  
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